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PRENATAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A CALL FOR 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN MARYLAND 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The alarming increase in chemical substance abuse in recent 
history has left no segment of the population untouched. Even the 
unborn are affected. In 1988, at least one thousand babies a day 
were born to women who used illegal drugs during pregnancy. I The 
future costs, both economic and emotional, of caring for these 
damaged children will be significant, particularly because the problem 
is increasing.2 Unfortunately, the status of the fetus as a legal entity 
that may be legally shielded from the untoward effects of drug and 
alcohol abuse is questionable. 
This Comment first reviews the medical effects of prenatal 
substance abuse and related social issues. Second, this Comment 
outlines the relevant legal implications, including constitutional con-
siderations and various state treatments of the problem. Third, it 
discusses the current status of Maryland law in this arena. Fourth, 
it critiques and analyzes various approaches. Finally, it offers possible 
alternatives to the Maryland approach. 
II. MEDICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES 
Exact statistics on the number of infants exposed to drugs in 
utero are lacking.3 A major difficulty in obtaining this statistical data 
is the lack of uniformity in testing and screening for prenatal sub-
stance abuse.4 Many hospitals have no formal procedures for prenatal 
substance abuse screening.s As a result, there is significant under-
counting in any numbers that have been compiled. 6 Research indicates 
that when screening and testing are uniformly applied, a much higher 
incidence of drug-exposed infants are identified.7 In one study, hos-
1. Michelle D. Wilkins, Comment, Solving the Problem 0/ Prenatal Substance 
Abuse: An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L.J. 
1401, 1401 (1990). 
2.Id. 
3. DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS: A GENERATION AT RISK, REpORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, 4 (U.S. General Accounting 
Office ed., 1990) [hereinafter GAO REpORT]. 
4.Id. 
5. [d. at 5. 
6. Id. at 4. 
7.Id. 
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pitals with rigorous detection procedures designed to identify maternal 
drug exposure had an incidence rate three to five times greater than 
that of hospitals without such screening procedures.8 Detecting ma-
ternal drug exposure is further complicated by the apparent bias in 
testing.9 While much of the public's attention has focused upon the 
"crack cocaine" problems of poor inner city women, evidence from 
blind studies suggests that the problem of prenatal drug use may be 
similar to that of middle class America. 10 
Although exact numbers are difficult to obtain, estimates indicate 
that drug abuse in its many forms is a significant public health 
problem. The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) estimates 
that "in 1988, five million women of childbearing age used illicit 
drugs."JI The greatest increase in drug use since the 1970s has been 
among young adults of child-bearing age who use' cocaine. 12 Experts 
attribute this increase to the ready availability and low cost of crack 
cocaine.13 As a result, "cocaine babies" now comprise 10-15070" of 
the populations of urban neonatal nurseries and intensive care units 
in major cities within the United States. 14' 
Unfortunately, this 10-15% figure does not represent the entire 
universe of prenatal drug exposure. Maternal prenatal ingestion of 
alcohol, cigarettes, methadone, heroin, and other legal and street 
drugs significantly contributes to this epidemic of "fetal abuse. "IS 
Fetal alcohol syndrome is now the leading known cause of mental 
retardation and birth defects.16 Cigarette smoking is estimated to 
account for 20-40% of the prevalence of below normal birth weight 
babies. 17 Maternal heroin and methadone addiction, among other 
8.ld. 
9. See Ira 1. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit Drug or Alcohol Use 
During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, 
Florida, 322 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 1202, 1205-06 (1990). 
10. Id. at 1205. Some researchers studying prenatal drug use state the following: 
"First, the overall prevalence of drug or alcohol use . . . was similar among 
women who received care from private physicians and those cared for at public 
health clinics. Second, the rate of substance use by pregnant women, as 
documented at the first prenatal visit, was similar for whites and blacks." Id. 
11. GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 1. 
12. Lynn Singer et al., Childhood Medical and Behavioral Consequences of Ma-
ternal Cocaine Use, 17 1. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 389, 390 (1992). 
13. GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 1. 
14. See Singer et al., supra note 12, at 390. 
15. See generally Ira 1. Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy: Parameters of Risk, 35 
PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 1403 (1988) [hereinafter Chasnoff, Parameters) 
(discussing the types and consequences of various forms of prenatal substance 
use). 
16. LAWRENCE S. WISSOW, CHILD ADVOCACY FOR THE CLINICIAN: AN APPROACH 
TO CHILD AB1,JSE AND NEGLECT 186 (1990). 
17. Id. 
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drugs, is responsible for prenatal growth retardation18 and neonatal 
drug withdrawal syndromes. 19 Actual injury to the infant resulting 
from fetal drug exposure may be substantial. In addition to the 
damaging intrauterine effects of drugs and alcohol, there is clear 
evidence of long term sequelae (i.e., after-effects). Fetal alcohol 
syndrome is manifested by intrauterine and postnatal growth defi-
ciency, microcephaly (small head and brain size), and facial anom-
alies.20 Additionally, mild to moderate mental retardation is common.21 
Many children born with fetal alcohol syndrome are later diagnosed 
with hyperactivity and other emotional and behavioral disorders. 22 
Maternal cocaine use reduces the supply of oxygen to the fetus, 
causing the potential for later problems in neurological and cognitive-
behavioral development. 23 For example, "[i]ntrauterine growth retar-
dation, also known to be associated with later child development 
problems, has been found in almost all studies comparing cocaine-
exposed to cocaine-free infants. "24 Cocaine-exposed infants suffer an 
increased incidence of prematurity and its attendant complications.2s 
Of particular concern in cocaine exposure are the concomitant high 
rates of infection, particularly from sexually transmitted diseases such 
as syphilis and the human immunodeficiency virus26-diseases which 
themselves have devastating consequences. These high rates of ex-
posure to sexually transmitted diseases are attributed to the fact that 
cocaine, and crack cocaine in particular, is a stimulant often used 
communally, resulting in an increased frequency of sexual activity. 27 
Studies of the development and behavior of cocaine-exposed 
infants beyond three years of age are lacking.28 According to studies 
of young children who were exposed to cocaine as infants, early 
treatment intervention aids both developmental lags and behavioral 
problems. 29 However, it is clear that these children required some 
18. Chasnoff, Parameters, supra note 15, at 1406. 
19. Id. 
20. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PEDIATRICS 1995 (Frank A. Oski et al., eds., 
1990). 
21. Id. at 1996. 
22.Id. 
23. Singer et at., supra note 12, at. 391. 
24. Id. at 391-92. 
25. Ira J. Chasnoff, Newborn Infants With Drug Withdrawal Symptoms, 9 PE-
DIATRICS IN REv. 273, 275 (1988). 
26. WISSOW, supra note 16, at 186. 
27.Id. 
28. Singer et al., supra note 12, at 394. 
29. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991: Hearings on 
P.L. 102-119 Before the Select Subcomm. on Educ. of the House Comm. on 
Educ. and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1991) (statement of Dan R. 
Griffith, Ph.D, National Association for Prenatal Addiction and Research 
(NAPRE». 
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type of rehabilitative or remedial services to make any progress at 
all. 30 Additionally, the research suggests that early intervention is 
necessary.31 Without early intervention, it is conceivable that many 
of these children would suffer more serious long term consequences. 
In addition to medical intervention, many drug-exposed infants 
require special education later on in life to address developmental, 
learning, emotional and behavioral problems resulting from their 
drug exposure in utero.32 In 1975, Congress enacted Public Law 94-
142, known as the "Education for All Handicapped Children Act,"33 
which is currently referred to as the "Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act. "34 The Act mandates that all children receive free 
public education appropriate to meet their particular learning needs, 
regardless of their handicapping or disabling conditions. 3s The Act 
defines "children with disabilities" as those suffering from mental 
retardation, serious emotional disturbances, and specific learning 
disabilities, among other things,36 and those "who, by reason thereof 
need special education and related services."37 Clearly, this definition 
encompasses children suffering from the mental retardation and 
cognitive disturbance effects of drug exposure in utero. 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act makes the pro-
vision of special education to these and other disabled children a 
requirement, not a luxury. Thus, the fiscal responsibility to provide 
the services is inherent, whether the cost is small or large, as it 
undoubtedly will be if more children require special services.38 For 
example, during the 1990-1991 school year, the State of Maryland 
30. [d. 
31. [d. 
32. GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 34. Some clinical reports indicate that cocaine-
exposed children exhibit patterns of behavioral problems similar to those seen 
in emotionally disturbed children. Singer et al., supra note 12, at 402. 
33. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 
Stat. 773 (1975). 
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990), amended by Pub. L. 101-476 
(1990) (amended to affect terminology change). 
35. [d. § 1400(c). 
36. [d. § 1401(a)(1)(A). Children with specific learning disabilities are further 
defined as 
[c]hildren who have a disorder in one or more of the basic psycho-
logical processes involved in understanding or in using language, 
spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect 
ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical 
calculations. Such disorders include such conditions as perceptual 
disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and 
developmental aphasia. 
[d. § 1401(a)(15). 
37. [d. § 1401(a)(1)(B). 
38. See GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 34-35. 
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had a total of 88,024 children from the ages of three to twenty-one 
participating in some type of special. education,39 at a cost in excess 
of 406.5 million dollars.40 Because children receiving special education 
are categorized by their handicapping condition, rather than by its 
cause,41 it is impossible to tell how many children are educationally 
disabled as a result of prenatal drug exposure. However, many of 
the handicapping conditions identified are those associated with fetal 
exposure to drugs and/or alcoho1.42 
The federal law authorizes the appropriation of federal funds to 
assist the states in educating children with special needs.43 The total 
amount that a state spends is augmented by federal money pursuant 
to a percentage scheme.44 A finite amount of money, however, can 
go only so far. Significant increases in the number of children 
receiving special educational services will unduly burden an already 
costly system. As more students require special education, this finite 
amount of money must be more broadly disbursed. 
Compounding the problem is the fact that substance abuse is 
strongly associated with other health and social risks.4s In addition 
to requiring a greater amount and costlier measure of educational 
and medical care,46 those children and their families who reside in 
homes where drug use and abuse is present are more likely to become 
the needy recipients of social service assistance programs.47 Nation-
wide, the demand for foster care placements rose 29% from 1986 to 
1989: Much of this increase was attributable to substance abuse in 
general. 48 
The likelihood of an individual having criminal involvement with 
the legal system seems greater when drug abuse is dominant in family 
life. Crack cocaine, in particular, is associated with increases in 
39. MARYLAND STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., THE FACT BOOK 28 (1992). 
40. [d. at 21. 
41. [d. at 30. 
42. [d. (discussing specifically mental retardation, emotional disturbance and spe-
cific learning disabilities as handicapping conditions). 
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
44. [d. § 1411. 
45. WISSOW, supra note 16, at 186. 
46. GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 6. Hospitals surveyed for the GAO REPORT 
indicated that hospital charges for drug-exposed infants were at least four times 
higher than charges for non-exposed infants. [d. . 
47. [d. at 30. In cities that require the reporting of drug-exposed infants to child 
welfare authorities, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of such 
reports from 1986 to 1989. In New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, these 
reports increased by 268070, 342%, and 1735%, respectively. [d. 
48. [d. at 33. The increase in foster care placements for children under two years 
of age rose even more dramatically. For example, in Illinois the number of 
infants in foster care who were younger than one year old increased by 284% 
from 1985 to 1989. [d. 
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interpersonal violence and increases in the proportion of fatal child 
abuse and neglect cases associated with drug use. 49 Although the 
number of arrests for the sale and possession of illegal drugs in 
Maryland declined somewhat during 1989-1991,50 possession and sales 
account for only a small portion of drug-related activity. 51 Other 
drug-related crimes include those committed under the influence of 
drugs, those committed to obtain money to buy drugs, and those 
associated with drug distribution. 52 
In general, the use of secondary drugs such as alcohol, marijuana 
and cigarettes is common among those who abuse other drugs.53 This 
secondary drug use phenomenon further complicates the evaluation 
of the infant exposed in utero to narcotics or cocaine. 54 Alcohol 
intoxication is highly correlated with criminal behavior: More than 
half of all murderers and their victims are believed to have been 
intoxicated at the time of the murder. 55 Additionally, the percentage 
of women who are assessed for driving while intoxicated has in-
creased.56 
III. LEGAL ISSUES 
While the need to control prenatal substance abuse is obvious, 
a dilemma arises concerning the reconciliation of maternal and fetal 
rights. Although there are no reported Maryland cases specifically 
addressing the issue of fetal abuse due to maternal drug use, a 
number of other states have decided the legal rights of the unborn 
in such a situation. Some of these states have criminally prosecuted 
49. WISSOW, supra note 16, at 187. 
50. MARYLAND ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE ADMIN., TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN 
ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE IN MARYLAND 96 (1991) [hereinafter TRENDS AND 
PATTERNS]. 
51. Id. at 105. 
52.Id. 
53. Chasnoff, Parameters, supra note 15, at 1408. 
54. WISSOW, supra note 16, at 186. In addition to the problems created by known 
drugs, street drugs may be adulterated with other substances, such as phen-
cyclidine, chalk, sugar, or talc, that may have untoward effects on the fetus. 
Id. 
55. THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 128 (3d ed. rev. 1987). 
56. TRENDS AND PATTERNS, supra note 50, at 83. Driving while intoxicated (DWI) 
assessments are conducted as soon as possible after an individual has been 
charged with a drinking and driving offense. Referrals for assessment are 
usually generated through the courts. The purpose of the assessments is to 
determine both the severity of the drinking problem and the most appropriate 
rehabilitative service for the offender. Id. at 79. 
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mothers under existing child abuse or drug-related statutes.S7 Other 
states have considered the use of civil commitment penaltiesS8 or tort 
liability. S9 A threshold issue in decision-making arises in all cases 
because state intervention in pregnancy poses problems of constitu-
tional dimensions. 
A. Constitutional Considerations 
The constraints to governmental intervention in a woman's de-
cisions about her pregnancy emanate from the interest in protecting 
her privacy rights. Since Griswold v. Connecticut,60 where the Su-
preme Court held that the right of a married couple to use contra-
ceptives fell within a general right of privacy, 61 women have been 
entitled to certain freedoms regarding the management of their re-
productive interests. Following the Griswold decision, the Court in 
Eisenstadt v. BaircJ62 soundly endorsed the privacy right in procreative 
interests when it extended the right to contraception to unmarried 
individuals. The Court firmly stated that "[i]f the right of privacy 
means anYthing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into rriatters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child. "63 
Under Roe v. Wade,64 the right of women to control their 
pregnancy was firmly established. The Supreme Court made clear in 
Roe that, within certain parameters, it is within a woman's funda-
mental right of privacy to make decisions affecting her own preg-
nancy. The Court, however, limited that right based upon the state's 
compelling interest in maternal health during the second trimester, 
and in the potential life of a viable fetus. 6s The Roe decision held 
that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy until the second 
57. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Johnson 
v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 
1992). 
58. Troy D. v. Kelly D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); In re Baby X, 
293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 
N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Misc. 
2d 1986). 
59. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). 
60. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
61. Id. at 485-86. 
62. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
63. Id. at 453. 
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
65. Id. at 150. 
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trimester virtually precludes any state intervention prior to this time.66 
If early prenatal drug abuse constituted actionable behavior, the 
"rather absurd result would be that endangering a fetus [would be] 
more severely punished than aborting it.' '67 
Under the standards set forth in Roe, a fetus is not a "person" 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analy-
sis.68 Once a fetus is viable, however, the state has a compelling 
interest in its protection.69 The Court based its decision on a "tri-
mester framework" to determine that crucial time.70 The third tri-
mester in a pregnancy signaled a point when the state's interest was 
activated because that was deemed about the time when a fetus has 
the capability of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb. "71 At 
viability, the fetus may indeed have some limited legal status. The 
Roe decision may be interpreted as holding that, although it is clear 
that prenatal substance abuse may cause fetal harm long before 
viability,72 the problem may not be considered a state problem until 
that point of viability.73 Under Roe, any legal recourse that might 
be available to the viable fetus would be absent for the nonviable 
fetus. 
The parameters set forth in Roe, however, are currently not as 
clear. In 1989 the Supreme Court, in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services,74 expanded the constitutionally permissible scope of state 
regulation of reproduction. While the Court did not explicitly overrule 
the abortion right in Roe, it refused to strike down the preamble to 
a Missouri statute which states that life begins at conception and 
that the unborn have some protectable interests.7s The Court further 
set the stage for dismantling the trimester framework by stating that 
it "[does] not see why the State's interest in protecting potential 
human life should come into existence only at the point of viability, 
and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation 
after viability but prohibiting it before viability. "76 
66. [d. at 163. 
67. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
68. 410 U.S. at 158. 
69. [d. at 163. 
70. [d. at 164-65. 
71. [d. at 163. 
72. Ira J. Chasnoff et aI., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 261 
JAMA 1741, 1744 (1989). The author states that "[ilt appears ... that cocaine 
exposure in only the first trimester does place the newborn at risk for neuro-
behavioral deficiencies compared with drug-free infants." [d. 
73. 410 U.S. at 163. 
74. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
75. [d. at 506-07. 
76. [d. at 519. 
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The conflict between maternal and fetal rights pits the woman's 
constitutional fundamental "right(s) to religious free exercise, phys-
ical autonomy, and privacy [against] the fetus' right to freedom from 
physical harm.' '77 State intervention in areas of fundamental rights 
requires 'a compelling state interest, and any restrictive action under-
taken by the state must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 78 
Those advocating state intervention argue that there is no fundamen-
tal right to illegal drug use. 79 These advocates further argue that the 
fetus "has a protectable legal right to be free from harm resulting 
from maternal conduct. "80 These arguments are premised upon the 
theory that a woman's right. of privacy related to her pregnancy 
extends only to her decision to have an abortion within the given 
parameters: Once she has decided to carry her pregnancy to term, 
the state has a compelling interest in the health of the fetus. 81 One 
obstacle to state intervention aimed at protecting the fetus from harm 
lies in reconciling the language· of statutes. In order for advocates to 
successfully urge state intervention, the language of the statutes must 
be interpreted so as to include the fetus within their scope. A number 
of courts have grappled with this statutory obstacle. 
B. State Treatment oj Prenatal Substance Abuse 
1. Criminal Liability of the Mother 
In Reyes v. Superior Court,82 a pregnant heroin addict was 
warned by a public health nurse about the dangers of drug use in 
pregnancy and the problems associated with the failure to seek 
prenatal medical care.83 Despite this warning, the woman continued 
77. Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of 
Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1331 (1990) [hereinafter Rethinking 
Motherhood] . 
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
79. State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992) (Wright, J., dissenting). The dissent 
quotes the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association as amicus as follows: 
[I]n the case at bar, the use of the test set out in Roe v. Wade and 
its prodigy [sic] to balance the privacy rights of a woman against the 
compelling interest the State possesses in the life and well-being of 
the unborn child is inappropriate. For here, we are not dealing with 
a fundamental right. There is no fundamental right to abuse cocaine. 
The act of using cocaine is not an act relating to a right connected 
with marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, or child 
bearing. • • • No special protection is afforded the cocaine abuser 
just because she is pregnant. 
[d. at 714 (second alteration in original) (omissions in original). 
80. Rethinking Motherhood, supra note 77, at 1331. 
81. See id. at 1331-32 for a general discussion of the arguments for state regulation. 
82. 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
83. [d. at 912-13. 
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to use drugs and to abstain from receiving prenatal care.84 When the 
woman later gave birth to twin boys who were addicted to heroin 
and suffering from withdrawal, felony child endangerment charges 
were filed against her. 85 The Court of Appeal of California held that 
the statute was not intended to apply to prenatal conduct. 86 The 
court stated that if "the Legislature determines to confer legal 
personality on unborn fetuses for certain limited purposes, it expresses 
that intent in specific and appropriate terms. "87 The court further 
noted the mandate to strictly construe penal statutes in favor of the 
defendant. 88 
Shortly 'after the Reyes decision, the Court of Appeals of Mi-
chigan reached a seemingly different conclusion. The court in In re 
Baby XS9 held that a newborn suffering from narcotics withdrawal 
because of prenatal matenial drug addiction may properly be consid-
ered a neglected child.90 The real difference between these two cases 
is the type of proceeding that was brought. In Reyes, the mother 
was prosecuted under a felony criminal statute.91 In contrast, Baby 
X involved a civil neglect suit92-a distinctly different type of pro-
ceeding where the aim is to protect rather than punish. Like the 
Reyes court, the Baby X court declined to give "wholesale recognition 
of fetuses as persons."93 However, the Baby X court adopted a 
limited recognition of the rights of the child in utero when it is in 
the child's best interest: The court opined that "since a child has 
legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body, it is within 
84. Id. at 913. 
85.Id. 
86.Id. 
87. Id. at 914. 
88.Id. 
89. 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). 
90. Id. at 739. 
91. Reyes, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913. Reyes was charged with two counts of felony 
child endangering in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 273a(1), which at the time 
read in part: 
"Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce 
great bodily harm or death, . . . having the care or custody of any 
child, ... willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such 
situation that its person or health is endangered, is punishable by 
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 1 year, or in the state 
prison for not less than 1 year nor more than 10 years." 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a)(I». 
92. Baby X, 293 N. W .2d. at 736. A petition was filed against Mother X in the 
Oakland County Probate Court alleging that she had "so neglected her child 
that the court should assert jurisdiction." Id. at 738. The probate court is a 
court given jurisdiction over such juvenile matters under MICH. COMPo LAWS 
ANN. § 712A.2 and MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(598.2). [d. 
93. Id. 
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this best interest to examine all prenatal conduct bearing on that 
right."94 The court further stated that "[s]ince prior treatment of 
one child can support neglect allegations regarding another child, 
... prenatal treatment can be considered probative of a child's 
neglect as well."9s 
Other courts have taken similar positions, reflecting the differ-
ences in a punitive versus protective approach to this dilemma. In 
another California case, Troy D. v. Kelly D. :~<> because an infant 
was born under the influence of drugs, the juvenile court's jurisdic-
tion was considered sufficient. 97 While the Court of Appeal of 
California only cursorily noted the Reyes decision, it lent credibility 
to the idea that "[a] fetus is accorded variable legal treatment due 
to social policies underlying different areas of the law. For example, 
an unborn fetus is not considered to be a child within California's 
felony child abuse statute .... "98 Nonetheless, the court cited Baby 
X with approval in deciding that prenatal use of dangerous drugs by 
a mother is probative of future child neglect. 99 The Family Court of 
New York has established similar standards.lOo 
In keeping with this trend, in People v. Hardy,JOI the Court of 
Appeals of Michigan held that a woman could not be criminally 
prosecuted for either child abuse or delivery of cocaine to her baby 
via the umbilical cord. I02 While the court made no mention of the 
Baby X case and its civil rationale for fetal rights, it did identify 
problems associated with applying a criminal law to a situation of 
this nature. In Hardy, a mother was charged with child abuse 
following allegations that she ingested cocaine while pregnant, thereby 
causing serious physical harm to her infant.lo3 The mother was also 
94. Id. at 739 (citations omitted). 
95.Id. 
96. 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
97. Id. at 874. 
98. Id. at 873. 
99. Id. at 874. The court pointed out that "[w]hile jurisdiction must be asserted 
on the basis of conditions which exist at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, 
the court is not required to disregard the mother's prior conduct." Id. 
100. In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990). In this 
case, where the father was also a respondent, the court recognized that the 
mother's drug use was responsible for the newborn's positive urine toXicology 
screen at birth. Id. at 447. However, the court also placed blame upon the 
father for dissuading the mother from participating in a drug treatment 
program. Id. Additionally, the court heard the father's arguments 1) that he 
did not pass cocaine to the fetus; and 2) that he never had care of the child. 
Id. at 448. The court identified the child's condition at birth as the precipitating 
event warranting judicial intervention, and based jurisdiction on the potential 
danger to the child. Id. at 449. 
101. 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991). 
102. Id. at 52-53. 
103. Id. at 51. 
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charged with the delivery of cocaine to the infant, because at the 
baby's birth, when the umbilical cord was still attached to both 
mother and baby, cocaine was being delivered from the mother to 
her child. 104 The court again highlighted the mandate to strictly 
construe penal statutes, and determined that the legislature did not 
intend for this statute to cover the offense charged.lOs Additionally, 
the court emphasized that a criminal statute must be sufficiently 
. definite and expliCit to put an individual on notice as to what behavior 
might be proscribed. 106 
This reluctance to broaden the scope of criminal statutes has 
been echoed in other jurisdictions. In State v. Gray,l07 the Supreme 
Court of Ohio declined to sustain the child endangerment conviction 
of a mother who had allegedly ingested cocaine during the third 
trimester of her pregnancy, thereby causing serious physical harm, 
cocaine withdrawal, to her infant. los The court again called attention 
to the need to strictly construe criminal statutes against the State and 
liberally construe them in favor of the accused. 109 In addition, the 
court refused to broadly read the word "child" in the statute to 
encompass a fetus when the legislature had declined to adopt such a 
broad interpretation yo Furthermore, the court pointed out that the 
legislature was indeed undertaking an investigation of prenatal ne-
glect. 1II 
In a compelling dissent, Judge Wright insisted that the "[l]aws 
of Ohio do protect the unborn child who is subsequently born 
alive."112 His dissent observed that the Ohio courts have determined 
that a viable fetus is a "child" for purposes of the child abuse 
statute, and that a cause of action exists when a viable fetus is 
negligently injured in utero and is subsequently stillborn.1I3 Addi-
104. Id. at 51-52. 
105. Id. at 52-53. 
106. Id. at 52. 
107. 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1991). 
108. Id. at 710. 
109. Id. at 711. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 712-13. At the time of this decision, the Ohio legislature had a pending 
bill which, if passed, would create a new crime of prenatal child neglect in an 
effort to address the issue of prenatal substance abuse and subsequent fetus/ 
infant exposure. Id. at 712. 
112. Id. at 714 n.5 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
113. Id. Judge Wright's dissent cited In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Misc. 2d 
1986), for the proposition that a viable fetus is a "child" for purposes of the 
child abuse statute. Gray, 500 N.E.2d at 714. His dissent appeared to overlook 
that the Ruiz court was construing a civil child abuse statute rather than a 
criminal child abuse statute. The Ruiz court specifically distinguished between 
civil and criminal child abuse statutes: 
Such a holding does not conflict with the . . . general principle that 
1993) Prenatal Substance Abuse 341 
tionally, his dissent cited with approval the brief of the Ohio Pros-
ecuting Attorneys Association as amicus: 
A pregnant woman is not, due to her maternity, immune 
from the consequences of her illegal acts. This case is not 
about a woman's choice to conceive or carry a child. This 
is about the right of a child to be born healthy, free of 
injuries inflicted by the illegal acts of another .114 
The dissent, however, apparently failed to consider the distinc-
tion between the civil and criminal approaches to the problem-a 
distinction recognized by other courts. In addition, the dissent also 
neglected to address whether recourse is available to a drug-exposed 
nonviable fetus that is subsequently born with defects resulting from 
that exposure. 
Florida courts have also declined to allow convictions of sub-
stance abusing mothers. liS As in the other criminal prosecution cases, 
the courts cite legislative intent for their justification. 1I6 Moreover, 
in Johnson v. State ,117 the Supreme Court of Florida indicated that 
it understood the relevant statutes to address the problem of drug 
dependent mothers and newborns as a public health problem rather 
than as a criminal problem. lls In Johnson, a case similar to People 
criminal statutes must be construed strictly. [The child abuse statute] 
is not a criminal statute. And the child endangerment provision 
specifies that there need not be a conviction under [the statute] in 
order to find that a child is abused. 
Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 938. 
114. Gray, 584 N.E.2d at 714. 
115. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, (Fla. 1992); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 
1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
116. In Gethers, the District Court of Appeal of Florida quoted with approval the 
following portion of Judge Sharp's dissent in Johnson: 
"From this legislative history, it is clear that the Legislature considered 
and rejected a specific statutory provision authorizing criminal pen-
alties against mothers for delivering drug-affected children who re-
ceived transfer of an illegal drug derivative metabolized by the mother's 
body, in utero. In light of this express legislative statement, I conclude 
that the Legislature never intended for the general drug delivery statute 
to authorize prosecutions . . . ." 
Gethers, 585 So. 2d at 1142 (quoting Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 422-23 (Sharp, 
J., dissenting». 
Judge Sharp's analysis was also adopted by the Florida Supreme Court, 
which reversed the district court of appeal's decision in Johnson. Johnson v. 
State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992), rev'g 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991). 
117. 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992). 
118 .. [d. at 1293. The court again adopted the language of the lower court's dissent: 
"[T]he legislature expressly chose to treat the problem of drug dependent 
mothers and newborns as a public health problem and that it considered but 
rejected imposing criminal sanctions via section 893.13(1)(c)(l)." [d. 
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v. Hardy,119 a woman was charged with delivery of a controlled 
dangerous substance to her newborn infant during the thirty to ninety 
seconds following the infant's birth, but before the umbilical cord 
was CUt. 110 In refusing to uphold a lower court conviction, the court 
opined that prosecuting mothers for drug use and "delivery" to their 
newborns may be the least effective means of addressing prenatal 
drug abuse. 121 The court contended that the fear of prosecution may 
have the effect of increasing the incidence of abortion, causing 
substance-abusing pregnant women to avoid prenatal care, or causing 
reluctance in health care workers to identify substance abusers.122 
Anyone of these negative effects, resulting from the fear of prose-
cution, would certainly undermine compelling state interests in pre-
venting harm to the child or the mother. 
2. Tort Liability of the Mother 
One commentator has suggested that "criminalization fails to 
strike at the heart of the issue. Because criminalization does not 
attempt to cure the addictions which cause fetal harm, it fails to 
protect the fetuses from the dangers of gestational substance abuse. " I23 
In addition to the described civil and criminal treatments of the fetal 
abuse problem, state intervention to prevent such abuse has been 
analyzed under a maternal duty of care theory.l24 While a funda-
mental right to privacy protects a woman's right to an abortion 
within certain limits, no similar protection of the right to abuse 
harmful substances exists. Therefore, under a duty of care theory, 
once a woman has decided to carry her pregnancy to term she 
assumes the duty to use reasonable care in ensuring the safety of the 
fetus. 12s Although it is a universal principle that a child may have a 
cause of action against a third party for injuries sustained in utero, 126 
parent-child immunity doctrines prevail in many jurisdictions, and 
may prevent a negligence claim by the drug-exposed child.127 
119. 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991). 
120. [d. at 1290-91. 
121. [d. at 1295-96. 
122. [d. 
123. Kristen R. Lichtenberg, Gestational Substance Abuse: A Call for a Thoughtful 
Legislative Response, 65 WASH. L. REv. 377, 393 (1990). 
124. See id. at 383-84 (discussing Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 
1988); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980». 
125. [d. at 388-89. 
126. E.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS § 55 (5th ed. 
1984). 
127. See; e.g., Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990) (holding that 
parent-child immunity doctrines apply to wrongful death and survival actions); 
Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986) (refusing to abrogate parent-
child immunity doctrines). 
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In Grodin v. Grodin,.28 however, the Court of Appeals of 
Michigan upheld the ability of a child to maintain a negligence suit 
against his mother for the injury he sustained from his mother's use 
of tetracycline during her pregnancy.129 Even though the actual injury, 
discolored teeth, was not manifested until some time after the mother 
took the drug, the court held that "the litigating child's mother 
would bear the same liability for injurious, negligent conduct as 
would a third person."130 In so holding, the court applied the 
principles of Plumley v. Klein,131 which abrogated intra-family tort 
immunity. 132 
The danger with an approach allowing the child to sue the 
mother in negligence for prenatal injuries lies in its tendency to place 
the mother in the position of the guarantor of the health of the 
fetus. 133 The ramifications of such a maternal responsibility are 
enormous. Imposing such a duty on the mother may not only create 
an adversarial relationship between mother and fetus, but also may 
effectively handcuff the mother from undertaking any activity that 
may have a potentially adverse effect on the child. Any realistic 
remedy for this type of tort action would be difficult to identify, 
and even more difficult to enforce. 
In contrast, Stallman v. Youngquist l34 did not involve the use 
of illegal, or even prescription drugs by a pregnant woman. The 
Supreme Court of Illinois, in Stallman, took a definitive stand on 
the issue of tort actions between mother and fetus. The court 
addressed whether a pregnant woman should be liable to her unborn 
child for negligent driving. us The court held that for purposes of 
tort liability, any recognition of a legal duty from mother to fetus 
must emanate from the legislature. 136 The court criticized Grodin for 
creating a legal fiction by "[treating] a pregnant woman as a stranger 
128. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). 
129. Id. at 869-70. 
130. Id. at 870. 
131. 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972). 
132. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 870. The court remanded the case to determine whether 
the mother, in her decision to continue using the drug during pregnancy, had 
used a "reasonable exercise of parental discretion." Id. at 871. The court 
emphasized that any intra-family tort immunity was abrogated, except where 
1) the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority 
over the child; and 2) the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable 
parental discretion with respect to the provisions of food, clothing, housing, 
medical and denfal services and other care. Id. at 870. 
133. Lichtenberg, supra note 123, at 389. 
134. 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988). 
135. Id. at 355-56. 
136. Id. at 361. 
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to her developing fetus for purposes of tort liability." 137 The court 
pointedly questioned as follows: 
By what judicially defined standard would a mother have 
her every act or omission while pregnant subjected to State 
scrutiny? By what objective standard could a jury be guided 
in determining whether a pregnant woman did all that was 
necessary in order not to breach a legal duty to not interfere 
with her fetus' separate and independent right to be born 
whole? In what way would prejudicial and stereotypical 
beliefs about the reproductive abilities of women be kept 
from interfering with a jury's determination of whether a 
particular woman was negligent at any point during her 
pregnancy? 138 
3. State and Federal Statutory Responses 
In response to maternal liability for prenatal substance abuse, a 
number of states have attempted to enact or modify laws that 
specifically address substance-related injury to the fetus. Aligned with 
related case law, prenatal substance abuse laws have been incorpo-
rated into statutes geared toward child protection or rehabilitation: 
No state has yet enacted criminal law.s specific to this purpose. 139 
Several states have identified children born with fetal alcohol 
syndrome or drug withdrawal symptoms as falling within the purview 
of child neglect statutes. In some of these states, a medical diagnosis 
of fetal alcohol syndrome or drug withdrawal symptoms at birth is 
prima facie evidence of neglect. l40 In other states, similar statutes 
require a reporting of prenatal substance abuse situations, triggering 
investigation but not necessarily a finding of neglect. 141 
Other states have approached prenatal substance abuse differ-
ently. Colorado requires that pregnan~ women who receive medical 
assistance benefits be assessed for the risk of a poor birth outcome 
due to substance abuse; where the risk is high, special assistance may 
be provided to reduce such risk.142 
137. [d. at 358. 
138. [d. at 360. 
139. Rethinking Motherhood, supra note 77, at 1329. 
140. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-18(2)(c)-(d) (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1(1) (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 432B.330.1(b) (Michie 1991). 
141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 1969 & Supp. 1993); UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 62A-4-504, 62A-4-509(1) (1989). 
142. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-4-508.2(1) (West Supp. 1992). 
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A number of other states tap into existing laws related to alcohol 
and drug abuse prevention,143 or health generally, 144 where provisions 
specifically target drug use in pregnancy as an area properly addressed 
through education and intervention. Statutory provisions of this 
nature provide for the establishment of screening, educational and 
treatment services for pregnant substance abusers and their children. 
One such statute in Wisconsin mandates the allocation of funds to 
provide these services within local public health agencies. 14s These 
laws are valuable because they directly address the problem without 
affixing blame or discouraging prenatal care. 
Although no specifically relevant federal legislation exists, Con-
gress has indicated an interest in the problem through proposed 
legislation to establish a program of grants for children exposed 
petinatally to drugs. l46 Through the Senate Committee on Finance, . 
the federal government has also· requested a special report on the 
subject from the General Accounting Office.147 Existing federal leg-
islation related to the issues of child abuse/neglectl48 and drug/alcohol 
abu~el49 only peripherally address the problem. None of this federal 
legislation, however, specifically addresses drug-exposed infants. 
IV. MARYLAND'S TREATMENT OF PRENATAL 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
Once born, an infant in Maryland is safeguarded by laws seeking 
to protect "children who have been the subject of abuse or ne-
glect. "ISO Maryland also has enacted criminal laws prohibiting child 
abuse,1SI the furnishing of alcohol to minors,JS2 the possessionls3 and 
143. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-644(a) (West 1992); Omo REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3793.15 (Baldwin 1993); OR. REv. STAT. § 430.955 (1991). 
144. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.183 (West Supp. 1992). 
145. [d. The statute allocates $250,000 in each of fiscal years 1989-90 and 1990-91. 
However, the grant is apparently time limited, as the statute specifically states 
that "[t]his section does not apply after June 30, 1993." [d. § 146.183(2). 
146. H.R. 3832, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). One purpose of this bill was to 
amend the "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act," 20 U.S.C. § 1400 
(1988 & Supp. II 1990), to identify drug-exposed children as a discrete group 
falling under the purview of the Act, thus requiring grant funding to address 
the issue. [d. § 1400(c). The bill was sent to various committees and apparently 
never resurfaced. 
147. GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 1. 
148. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment and Adoption Reform Act sets guidelines for the nianagement of 
these matters. 
149. [d. 
150. MD. CODE ANN .• PAM. LAW § 5-702 (1991). 
151. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (1992). 
152. [d. § 401A. However, § 401A(b) provides an exception if alcohol is provided 
by an immediate family member and consumed in a private residence. [d. § 
401A(b). 
153. [d. § 286 (1992 & Supp. 1993). 
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distribution of controlled dangerous substances,154 and the battering 
of family members. 155 Currently, no counterpart statutory provisions 
specifically address the interests of the unborn. Maryland law clearly 
identifies a child as "any individual under the age of eighteen 
years."156 Consequently, what may not be administered to an infant 
who has just emerged from the womb may apparently be freely 
administered to a fetus with impunity. Although the devastating 
effects of fetal abuse are well-documented,157 Maryland has yet to 
adopt any legal provisions to protect the fetus from such abuse when 
it is caused by the mother. 
Notably, Maryland courts have identified some legal rights for 
the unborn when injury or death results from the behavior of a third 
party. The Court of Appeals of Maryland first addressed injury 
inflicted to a fetus in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch,158 where an infant 
born prematurely suffered injuries resulting in blindness after an 
automobile accident in which the infant's pregnant mother was a 
passenger. 159 In a scholarly opinion, the court presented an exhaustive 
historical accounting of the law as it relates to the unborn. 16O Absent 
any applicable statutes, the court's holding reflected its understanding 
of the common law as it should be applied in Maryland. 161 Utilizing 
this common law application, the court held that the infant was 
entitled to recover against the defendant drivers for injuries sustained 
in utero. 162 
The court of appeals reached a similar conclusion in Odham v. 
Sherman,163 where a full-term viable fetus was delivered stillborn 
following the mother's involvement in an automobile accident caused 
by the defendant's negligence. l64 While the court viewed Gorsuch as 
controlling for the proposition that a viable child born dead is a 
154. [d. § 287 (1992). 
155. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-504 to 509 (1991 & Supp. 1993). These 
sections do not actually prohibit domestic violence as a criminal activity; more 
precisely, they serve to identify the available recourse to a victim of domestic 
violence, and authorize the court, upon clear and convincing evidence of abuse, 
to issue protective orders. Section 4-508 provides for the protective order to 
be backed by punitive sanctions for violations. Section 4-509 provides for 
penalties for failure to comply with court orders. 
156. [d. § 5·701(d). 
157. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text. 
158. 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951). 
159. [d. at 418-19, 79 A.2d at 550. 
160. [d. at 419-37, 79 A.2d at 550-59. 
161. See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 5(a) (Supp. 1993) (stating in part that "the 
Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England"). 
162. Gorsuch, 197 Md. at 440-41, 79 A.2d at 560-61. 
163. 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964). 
164. [d. at 182, 198 A.2d at 72. 
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"person" for purposes of Lord Campbell's Act,.6S it acknowledged 
that Gorsuch dealt with an infant born alive. l66 Nonetheless, the' 
court did not think that the language of Gorsuch was "intended to 
impose a limitation or condition of birth. "167 Therefore, the Odham 
court limited its holding to infants viable at the time of the wrong, 
stating that "[w]e think the weight of present authority draws the 
line at least at a point where the common law concept of viability 
is in effect." 168 
Maryland courts did not confront the issue of a nonviable fetus 
until almost twenty years later. In Group Health Ass'n v. Blumen-
thal,l69 the court of appeals made it clear that viability at the time 
of injury is not required to uphold an infant's cause of action if the 
infant is born alive. 170 In Blumenthal, an infant born alive subse-
quently died because of an obstetrician's negligence in failing to 
address the mother's problem of an incompetent cervix early in her 
pregnancy.171 Because the doctor had failed to perform the necessary 
minor surgery during the early months of pregnancy, the infant was 
born premature and was unable to survive.172 The court upheld the 
. wrongful death action, notwithstanding that the actual injury oc-
curred during a period of fetal nonviability.113 
More recently, Maryland courts' have determined the status of a 
fetus in a criminal context. In Williams v. State,174 a defendant's 
homicide conviction was upheld when an infant born alive died soon 
thereafter from injuries received in utero when the defendant shot 
165. [d. at 183, 198 A.2d at 72. At that time Lord Campbell's Act was codified as 
MD. CODE ANN. art. 67, §§ 1, 4 (1957) and stated the following: 
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, 
neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if 
death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an 
action and recover damages in respect thereof, the . . . person who 
would have been liable if death had not ensued ... shall be liable to 
an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person 
injured. 
[d. at 181, 198 A.2d at 71 (omissions in original). 
166. [d. at 183, 198 A.2d 72-73. 
167. [d. at 184, 198 A.2d at 73. 
168. [d. at 185, 198 A.2d at 73. The common law understanding of viability referred 
to "quickening," the time when a mother first begins to feel fetal movement. 
See Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 420, 79 A.2d 550, 550-51 (1951). 
169. 295 Md. 104, 453 A.2d 1198 (1983). 
170. [d. at 116, 453 A.2d at 1206. 
171. [d. at 107, 453 A.2d at 1201. An incompetent cervix is defective in its 
musculature and thus is prone to dilation too early in the pregnancy: Without 
corrective surgery, the condition will result in premature delivery of the fetus. 
[d. n.2. 
172. [d. at 108, 453 A.2d at 1201. 
173. [d. at 118-19, 453 A.2d at 1206-07. 
174. 316 Md. 677; 561 A.2d 216 (1989). 
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the mother with a bow and arrow.17S The infant in utero was 
necessarily deemed a "person" for purposes of the homicide convic-
tion. Although the infant in Williams had reached the point of 
viability,176 the question remains whether the same result would have 
occurred had the fetus been nonviable. 
As these cases make clear, a third party is liable to a viable 
fetus for injuries caused by that party, regardless of the infant's 
status upon emerging from the womb. However, liability does not 
result when the third party is a parent of that fetus/infant. Since 
1930, Maryland has subscribed to the parent':child immunity doctrine 
elucidated in Schneider v. Schneider,177 where the court held that a 
mother could not sue her minor child for injuries received as a result 
of the child's negligent driving.178 In reaching its decision, the court 
utilized the reasoning of other jurisdictions which have held that a 
child could not sue his parent. 179 The Schneider court, therefore, 
applied the parent-child immunity against both the parent and the 
child seeking to bring suit and, as a result, has clearly established 
the policy in Maryland. 
Since Schneider, Maryland has steadfastly refused to abrogate 
the parent-child immunity doctrine as applied to minor children. ISO 
In Frye v. Frye,1sl the court of appeals discussed the policy reasons 
for the maintenance of the parent-child immunity doctrine in the 
past, declaring the following: 
[T]his Court has had an abiding belief that the parent-child 
immunity rule enhances the public policy in that it sub serves 
the repose of families and the best interests of society by 
preserving the peace and harmony of society and of the 
families composing society. Therefore, the inquiry how turns 
175. [d. at 679, 561 A.2d at 217. 
176. The mother was nine months pregnant at the time of the shooting. [d. at 679, 
561 A.2d at 217. 
177. 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930). 
178. [d. at 19, 152 A. at 498. 
179. [d. at 22, 152 A. at 499. 
180. See Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990) (applying parent~child 
immunity to children born out of wedlock); Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 
A.2d 826 (1986) (applying parent-child immunity to son suing father for injuries 
sustained in automobile accident); Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 190 A. 753 
(1937) (applying parent-child immul}ity to divorced parent living apart from 
child); Sanford v. Sanford, 15 Md. App. 390, 290 A.2d 812 (1972) (applying 
parent-child immunity to child suing father for personal injuries arising out of 
automobile accident); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (holding 
that parent-child immunity is constitutional and does not violate equal protec-
tion guarantees), cert. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971). 
181. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986). 
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to the validity of that belief under present day mores and 
in light of the current status of the law .... 182 
349 
The court maintained that the preservation of parental authority and 
family unity was a policy as strongly held today as in the past, and 
that "[i]t is clear that today's parent-child relationship, as recognized 
by this Court and the legislature, furnishes no compelling reason to 
abrogate the rule. "183 Thus, until this doctrine is either overturned 
by the courts or abrogated by statute, parent-child immunity remains 
the rule in Maryland, and thus precludes any action by or on behalf 
of an infant for damages arising from fetal abuse. 
The absence of Maryland statutes acknowledging the existence 
of fetal abuse compounds the problem. Although several attempts 
have been made to introduce bills into the legislature which would 
amend the existing family law article to include laws related to 
prenatal use of controlled dangerous substances and subsequent infant 
harm, these bills have failed to gain the requisite approval of both 
the House and the Senate. The most recent Bill, which passed in the 
Senate but received an unfavorable review in the House Judiciary 
Committee, where it subsequently died, has not been substantially 
changed from previous bills. 184 The Bill sought to expand the current 
statutory definition of neglect as follows: 
"Neglect" includes use of a controlled dangerous substance, 
as defined under article i7, § 277 of the code, by a woman: 
1. resulting in an infant's addiction to or dependence on 
a controlled dangerous substance; or 
2. resulting in the presence of a controlled dangerous 
substance in an infant evidenced by toxicology or other 
appropriate tests. 18S 
The proposed amendment further identifies that an investigation 
shall include what is required in other neglect cases and 
(3) [i]f the suspected abuse or neglect of an infant involves 
possible use of a controlled dangerous substance, as defined 
under article 27, § 277 of the code, by the infant's mother: 
(I) a toxicology or other appropriate chemical test of the 
infant; and 
(II) a report to the appropriate division of the local 
Department of Social Services on the mother's use of a 
controlled dangerous substance. 186 
182. [d. at 552, 505 A.2d at 831. 
183. [d. at 561, 505 A.2d at 836. 
184. S. 660, Reg. Sess. (1992) (originally introduced as S. 657 (1991». 
185. [d. 
186. [d. 
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Although the Maryland General Assembly has not passed a 
prenatal abuse statute, it has established an Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
Administrationl87 to "[p]romote, develop, establish, conduct, certify,. 
and monitor programs for the prevention, treatment, and rehabili-
tation related to the misuse of alcohol and drugs; [and] [p]romote 
and conduct training and research related to the misuse of alcohol 
and drugs." 188 The authority to develop programs which specifically 
address the needs of pregnant women clearly lies within the domain 
of the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration. 189 However, because 
the enabling statute does not identify the different types of programs 
to be generated, there is no mandate to address the substance abuse 
problems of certain discrete risk groups. 
Another attempt to legislate on the subject of prenatal substance 
abuse came in 1992 with the introduction of House Bill 1459.190 The 
purpose of this Bill was to require the state Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
Administration to establish referral procedures to address the problem 
of prenatal substance abuse. 191 The Bill sought to require health care 
practitioners to report pregnant women suspected of being chemically 
dependent to the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration for referral 
to treatment services. 192 This Bill also died in committee without ever 
being passed in either house. Thus, the Maryland General Assembly 
has yet to pass any relevant legislation to address the problem. 193 
187. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 8-201 (1990). 
188. /d. § 8-401. 
189. See id. 
190. H.D. 1459, Reg. Sess. (1992). 
191. [d. 
192. [d. 
193. The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, pursuant to §§ 2-104(b), 15-
103, and 15-105 of the Health-General Article of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland, established a case management program designed to 
demonstrate the costs and effectiveness of two innovative outreach 
strategies for pregnant, Medicaid-eligible substance abusers. Specifi-
cally, the demonstration project will compare the effectiveness of case 
management and support groups in motivating use of prenatal care 
and drug treatment and in improving maternal and infant health. 
COMAR 1O.09.31.04B. This demonstration project, however, is only intended 
to last for three years, effective September I, 1992, and cover a narrow group 
of pregnant women having substance-abuse problems. [d. 10.09.31.02, 
10.09.31.04, 10.09.31.13. Only pregnant women meeting the following char-
acteristics are eligible to participate in the program: (1) Women in a "federal 
categorically needy eligibility category . . . because the recipient is receiving 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children," id. 1O.09.31.02A; (2) Women 
electing to participate "before the 28th week of ... pregnancy and ending the 
7th month following delivery or termination of pregnancy," id. 1O.09.31.02B; 
(3) Women between the ages of 18 and 45, id. 1O.09.31.02C; (4) Women 
"diagnosed with illicit psychoactive substance abuse or dependence," id. 
1O.09.31.02C; (5) Women residing within various zip codes located in Baltimore 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Resolution of the prenatal substance abuse problem will obvi-
ously be difficult. In creating appropriate legislation to address this 
problem, consideration must be given to a number of factors. While 
attempts have been made in other jurisdictions to impose criminal 
liability upon the mother,l94 to date, no jurisdiction has upheld a 
mother's conviction for passing illicit drugs to her fetus in utero. 19S 
The use of a statutory construction analysis, strictly construing 
criminal laws,l96 evidences an awareness that criminal laws were not 
designed to address public health issues. Furthermore, criminal pros-
ecution following the birth of an exposed infant does nothing to 
further the goal of ensuring healthy children. Rather than providing 
a vehicle for treatment of substance abuse problems in pregnancy, 
the fear of prosecution may .have a chilling effect on a mother's 
decision to seek any prenatal care. 
Civil commitment proceedings, which identify infant drug ex-
posure as a prima facie case of neglect, would have similar results. 
In many cases, a finding of abuse or neglect results in removal of 
the child from the home. Removing a child from the home does 
nothing to promote the "preservation of parental authority and the 
family unity" that the court of appeals held so dear in Frye v. 
Frye .197 Additionally, drug or alcohol dependence is not dispositive 
of neglectful parenting. In contrast, drug or alcohol dependency does 
indicate the need for educational and rehabilitative intervention for 
both mother and child. Likewise, other Civil remedies do not provide 
a ready solution to the problem of prenatal substance abuse. Given 
the status of the parent-child immunity doctrine in Maryland 198 and 
City, id. 1O.09.31.02E; and (6) Women "not enrolled in a drug abuse treatment 
program at the time of entry into the demonstration project," id. 10.09.31.02F. 
Obviously, this type of response by an administrative agency will hardly address 
the problem of substance abuse among pregnant women since it is limited both 
in duration and scope. 
194. See supra notes 82-121 and accompanying text. 
195. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1297 (Fla. 1992). 
196. See, e.g., People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 
471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991). The language of Hardy typifies the sentiments 
of other jurisdictions regarding the construction of criminal statutes to include 
prenatal substance abuse conduct. The Hardy court stated: 
We are not persuaded that a pregnant woman's use of cocaine, which 
might result in the postpartum transfer of cocaine metabolites ... is 
the type of conduct that the Legislature intended to be prosecuted 
under the delivery-of-cocaine statute .... This, in our opinion, would 
not be a reasonable construction of the statute. 
[d. at 53. 
197. 305 Md. 542, 561, 505 A.2d 826, 836 (1986). 
198. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text. 
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in other jurisdictions, it is unlikely that relief will come in the form 
of tort liability. 
Attempts at legislation have also proved unfruitful, perhaps 
because the proposed laws have failed to consider the potential 
consequences of both the civil and criminal approaches to the prob-
lem. Senate Bill 660 and others like it are flawed for several reasons. 
Bills like Senate Bill 660 imp<;>rtantly fail to address prenatal substance 
abuse as the real problem-these bills do not mention how drug use 
by the "woman" might result in an infant's addiction. Prenatal drug 
use is not identified as the culprit. The plain language of bills singling 
out the mother pose a potential equal protection problem if a drug-
using father is not similarly identified as neglectful. A law solely 
applicable to women will not withstand strict scrutiny. 199 Furthermore, 
if a drug-exposed infant automatically triggers a neglect report, this 
report may have the same chilling effect on pregnant women seeking 
prenatal care as would a criminal statute. Practically speaking, op-
position to the enactment of legislation addressing prenatal substance 
abuse stems from the potentially enormous fiscal responsibility that 
would attach to its enforcemenUoo Already overburdened local de-
partments of social service and' protective service units would be 
additionally burdened in an effort to accommodate prenatal substance 
abuse legislation. 201 
House Bill 1459 was another attempt to incorporate some of the 
relevant prenatal substance abuse language into existing legislation 
related to alcohol and drug abuse prevention and treatment.202 How-
ever, House Bill 1459 is too vague because it does not specify how 
the recommended program might be implemented. In contrast, the 
Bill is too narrow because it would limit the types of chemical 
199. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 46, (1981) ("Equality of rights under 
the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex."). 
200. Telephone interview with Carla Simon, LCSW, Program Specialist, Maryland 
Dept. of Human Resources 1n Baltimore, Md. (Oct. 3, 1992). 
201. Id. 
202. H.D. 1459, Reg. Sess. (1992). The Bill's proposed amendment to MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 8-402 states that "the Administration shall establish a 
referral procedure to link chemically dependent women referred to the Admin-
istrator under the provisions of § 1-207 of the Health Occupations article with 
an appropriate facility or services for the treatment of drug abuse." Id. The 
proposed amendment to the health occupations article reads in pertinent part: 
Id. 
A health care practitioner who is providing health care services to a 
pregnant woman and who suspects that the woman is chemically 
dependent shall refer that woman to the Administrator of the Alcohol 
and Drug Abuse Administration in the Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene for referral to an appropriate facility or services for 
the treatment of drug abuse. 
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dependence which trigger action.203 As a result, while a pregnant 
cocaine addict may be appropriately referred for assistance under the 
statute, a pregnant alcoholic may not be referred. 204 
Finally, although the Maryland courts have not grappled with 
the problem of prenatal substance abuse, Maryland residents are not 
immune to this problem. Estimates indicate that approximately 7440 
drug affected newborns were born in Maryland in 1990 at a total 
cost of 387 million dollars. lOS Efforts to enact prenatal substance 
abuse legislation indicate that there is a growing awareness of the 
effects of prenatal substance abuse: It may only be a matter of time 
before prenatal substance abuse is challenged in a Maryland court. 
Because prenatal substance abuse is bound to enter the courts, the 
Maryland General Assembly should assume a proactive stance, . and 
adopt a cogent plan for addressing fetal substance exposure, which 
respects the rights of both mother and fetus. 
VI. RECOMME~DA TIONS FOR LEGISLATION 
Maryland. has enacted many laws providing for comprehensive 
health services for. singular problems. Similar laws would be appro-
priate to address the concerns of substance abuse in pregnancy. One 
such law requires the establishment of a program for early identifi-
cation and treatment of infants at risk for developing a hearing 
impairment. 206 Similar statutes related to Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome explicitly detail the State's expectation in the facil-
itation of the treatment of this illness.207 Laws are also in place 
providing for the testing and education of those pregnant women at 
risk for having children with sickle cell disease.2os Similar legislation 
established a kidney disease program with attendant services209 and 
an advisory council on arthritis and related diseases. 2lo These "health 
promotion" laws provide guidelines and definitively establish pro-
grams for the evaluation and treatment of specific medical conditions. 
They also provide education and direction for health care practition-
ers. 
203. [d. The proposed bill identifies "chemically dependent" as "engaging in the 
habitual or excessive use for a nonmedical purpose of any of the following 
controlled substances or their derivatives: (I) amphetamine; (II) cocaine; (III) 
heroin; (IV) methamphetamine; or (V) phencyclidine." [d. 
204. [d. 
205. Cocaine Babies' Cost: $504 Million Study Calls for Drug Treatment of Moms-
To-Be, BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, Sept. IS, 1991, at A3. 
206. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-602(a) (1990). 
207. [d. § lS-333. 
20S. [d. § lS-502. 
209. [d. § 13-301 (1990 & Supp. 1993). 
210. [d. § 13-502. 
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The legislature has also explicitly directed medical practitioners 
to provide specific interventions under certain circumstances. For 
example, those who provide primary care to pregnant women are 
mandated to perform blood sampling for syphilis at least twice during 
the woman's pregnancy.21I Another law requires that the physician 
or midwife attending the birth to administer certain prophylactic 
medication to the infant immediately thereafter. 212 Clearly, the Gen-
eral Assembly is not adverse to legislating matters of far reaching 
public health policy. Creating free-standing statutes to address par-
ticular health issues is not without precedent. 
The Maryland legislature should craft prenatal substance abuse 
laws which reflect the thoughtfulness of the statutes just discussed. 
A realistic law would call for the establishment of an advisory council 
to address the needs of high risk pregnant women. The law should 
include provisions for mandatory prenatal substance abuse screening; 
a method of educating both patients and health care practitioners; 
authority to develop treatment programs geared to the peculiar needs 
of the pregnant addict; and infant intervention programs for those 
born exposed. Although the cost of such a comprehensive program 
may initially be substantial, failure to act may result in even higher 
costs in social services, education and medical care. Research suggests 
that the costs of crime and other economic consequences of drug 
abuse are actually lowered after treatment.213 Rather than focusing 
upon a mother's failures, such laws may prevent negative results by 
directing medical practitioners to intervene early and follow through 
with necessary treatment. Explicit language within an existing statute 
would ensure that the issues of pregnant women with substance abuse 
problems are addressed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Prenatal substance abuse is a serious problem which can result 
in potentially devastating effects to a fetus. Nevertheless, the right 
of a fetus to be born healthy and free from injury, when weighed 
against a mother's right to privacy and autonomy, is limited by 
constitutional parameters and statutory construction. Unless laws 
explicitly contemplate the fetus as a legal entity, criminal sanctions 
against a mother will not be upheld. Although civil definitions of 
neglect or abuse have been construed to protect the fetus, this 
approach does not address the heart of the problem. Remedies which 
211. [d. § 18-307 (1990). 
212. [d. § 18-308. 
213. NATIONAL AssocIATION OF STATE ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE DIRECTORS, TREAT-
MENT WORKS: THE TRAGIC COST OF UNDERVALUING TREATMENT IN THE "DRUG 
WAR," 24 (1990). 
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serve only to protect the child do nothing to curb the problem of 
maternal substance abuse. A comprehensive approach to prevention 
and treatment for mother and child must be instituted. The Maryland 
General Assembly should enact a statute designed specifically to 
address the problem of prenatal substance abuse. Until either the 
Maryland General Assembly or the Maryland courts address prenatal 
substance abuse, the citizens of Maryland will continue to bear the 
long-term costs associated with infants who are born exposed to 
alcohol and drugs. 
Mary J. Pizzo 
